

The Testimony of Baker Spring
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The Heritage Foundation
on
Nonproliferation and the G-8
before
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International Terrorism and Nonproliferation

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Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to have the opportunity to testify before this distinguished subcommittee on the efforts of the G-8 to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹

The G-8 Nonproliferation Effort

Mr. Chairman, Starting at the Kananaskis Summit in Canada in 2002, the G-8 nations, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom, have paid special attention to the issue of preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them, as well as reducing the likelihood that such destructive weapons could be diverted to terrorist groups.² These efforts been focused on programs to destroy, secure, or otherwise control dangerous weapons material, the weapons themselves, and their delivery systems, starting in now-independent states of the former Soviet Union, and Russia in particular. More recently, however, the G-8 nations have moved to expand international participation in this mission by including other donor and recipient nations. The steps the G-8 have taken in this area include the following:

1. **The Kananaskis Summit of 2002.** At the Kananaskis Summit, G-8 leaders established the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this program, the G-8 set a goal of raising \$20 billion to be spent over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety projects in the states of the former Soviet Union. This commitment attempts to prevent terrorists or states that support them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and related

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² The European Union is also represented at G-8 summits.

materials, equipment, and technology. It does so pursuant to a set of principles on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction adopted at this summit.

2. **The Evian Summit of 2003.** The 2003 G-8 Summit at Evian marked the initial progress toward implementing the destruction and securing of weapons and materials under the Global Partnership, particularly in Russia. It encouraged the addition of donor states to the programs, as well as the inclusion of additional recipient states. The G-8 leaders also adopted a statement on securing the sources of radioactive material.
3. **The Sea Island Summit of 2004.** At the June 2004 G-8 Summit at Sea Island, the participating states adopted an action plan on nonproliferation. Among other things, the action plan reaffirmed the commitment to the Global Partnership. It committed the members to limiting the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies so that G-8 countries would refrain from selling such equipment and technologies to additional states on an interim basis. It endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative, which supports operations for interdicting the shipments of dangerous materials and weapons. The action plan also commended the United Nations Security Council for adopting a resolution on April 28, 2004, requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. This G-8 action plan also urged all states to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, which allows more effective safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials, as soon as possible and said that the Additional Protocol “must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.”³

Looking ahead to the upcoming Gleneagles Summit, which takes place next week, nonproliferation will continue to be on the G-8 agenda. First, the leaders may agree to establish an approach for limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies on a permanent basis. However, the better approach for now may be to extend the existing policy of interim restraint agreed to at the Sea Island Summit. Second, it is expected that the G-8 will explore means for increasing preparedness for responding to the outbreak of disease and defending against biological attacks by terrorists. Third, the G-8 leaders are likely to assess the success of specific weapons and materials destruction and security measures funded under the Global Partnership. Finally, recent news account indicate that the Bush Administration is undertaking a targeted plan for freezing the U.S.-based assets of those engaged in business with foreign companies involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and will brief the G-8 partners on this plan.

Measuring the Success of the G-8 Nonproliferation Agenda

The G-8's nonproliferation agenda is very much a work in progress. This is particularly the case with the Global Partnership, which is the most resource intensive and

³ U.S. Department of State, “G-8 Action Plan on NonProliferation,” June 9, 2004, at <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/33378.htm> (June 23, 2005).

programmatically based element of the G-8 strategy. On the other hand, the diplomatic elements of the strategy have shown more rapid progress.

On the diplomatic front, the United States and its G-8 partners can point to a number of significant accomplishments. These include:

- The 2004 adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 requiring states to criminalize proliferation activities, adopt export controls, and secure sensitive materials;
- The 2003 adoption of the Proliferation Security Initiative to organize interdictions of the trans-shipments of weapons, weapons materials, and delivery systems and actions since that time to broaden participation and support for the initiative;
- Broadening participation in the Global Partnership to include additional donor and recipient states; and
- Significant progress in obtaining access to important facilities in Russia and other now-independent states of the former Soviet Union—particularly in the area of waiving taxes and fees on those performing services in the areas of weapons dismantlement and security. An agreement with Russia regarding liability for any accidents that occur in the disposal of plutonium seems close at hand.

On the programmatic side, there is room for progress. Although there have been significant successes with implementation of Libya's disarmament pledge and the breakup of the A.Q. Khan nuclear supply network, there is a need to shift focus regarding the Global Partnership to implementation steps. To date, the G-8 states have pledged between \$17 billion and \$18 billion toward the \$20 billion goal for Global Partnership activities. While specific actions on the ground in Russia and other recipient countries are underway, there remains much to be done in terms of both dismantlement and security activities. Nevertheless, it is possible to point to some progress on the programmatic side of the Global Partnership. Implementation steps have taken place in the following areas:

- The destruction of chemical weapons, particularly in Russia;
- The dismantlement of nuclear submarines in Russia;
- Securing nuclear materials;
- Providing for better security of Russian nuclear warheads;
- Securing dangerous biological agents; and
- Redirecting former weapons scientists to civilian research projects.

On the other hand, activities under the Global Partnership have encountered a number of significant hurdles. These include an acknowledgement that there are institutions within the Russian government that are suspicious of these programs and move to slow implementation efforts. Further, Russia continues modernize its nuclear force at the same time that it is receiving billions of dollars from U.S. taxpayers for the purpose of reducing the threat. Russian tactical nuclear weapons remain virtually untouched by Global Partnership programs. At a minimum, it is plausible that the Russian government continues to obscure the scope of its biological weapons program. The most recalcitrant proliferating states, Iran and North Korea, are not likely to join the Global Partnership as recipient states anytime soon. As a result of these hurdles, the temptation exists among the supporters of the Global Partnership programs to focus on the input side of ledger—particularly on the financial resources that are made available—and less on the outcomes that lead to qualitative improvements in security.

As a result, it is best to assess the value of the G-8 nonproliferation agenda generally and the Global Partnership in particular from a balanced perspective. A balanced perspective requires acknowledging that the G-8 agenda is narrowly focused on dismantlement, securing dangerous materials and weapons, and finding alternative endeavors for weapons scientists. Generally, it has failed to establish a clear connection between arms control programs and military and defense programs. The exception to this has been G-8 support for the Proliferation Security Initiative. Consequently, the G-8 effort, as valuable as it is, only fills a niche in the Bush Administration's December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The G-8 needs to recognize, as the Bush Administration clearly does, that it must support the tools of deterrence, defenses, and offensive military capabilities, as well as arms control, in combating proliferation. As such, the weakness of the G-8 agenda is found in the lack of context that would otherwise define its contributing role in improving security.

The G-8 Nonproliferation Agenda in Context—A Damage Limitation Strategy

The G-8 nonproliferation agenda will benefit from an effort by the leadership to propose an overarching concept for protecting national security in today's environment, in which the risks of weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands are quite severe. It needs to adopt an overarching concept that builds on the Bush Administration's National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which defines the contributions of deterrence, defenses, offensive military capabilities (including preemption), and arms control in confronting the proliferation danger.

At the heart of this overarching concept should be a damage limitation strategy. Specifically, the tools of deterrence, defenses, offensive military capabilities, and arms control should be used in concert with one another to:

- reduce the incentives for others to obtain weapons of mass destruction;

- reduce the likelihood that such weapons will be used in acts of aggression;
- limit the scope of any attacks that may occur using such weapons; and
- limit the damage such attacks may inflict, and thus help expedite recovery.

Specifically, the G-8 leadership should issue a statement adopting the damage limitation strategy as their collective approach to addressing the proliferation problem. Although there is too little time before next week's Gleneagles Summit to expect such a statement in Scotland, the leaders can make sure that it is on the agenda for next year's summit.

The G-8 leaders, however, need to recognize three inherent features of the damage limitation strategy. They are:

1. **Arms control and military instruments have a symbiotic relationship.** Strong military capabilities can create incentives for would-be proliferators to abandon their pursuits and allow arms control to succeed. Evidence suggests that the Libyan government learned the right lesson from the allied intervention in Iraq, which helped facilitate the recent success in dismantling Libyan weapons of mass destruction infrastructure. Likewise, successful arms control can and should serve to drive the weapons programs of aggressive states in a direction where U.S. and allied military and defensive capabilities can most easily address the threat.
2. **Military forces must mix offensive and defensive capabilities.** During the Cold War, offensive capabilities dominated U.S. strategic forces. This imbalance in favor of offense over defense leads to a military posture that is too inflexible for an age in which emerging threats are unpredictable and develop very rapidly. As a result, U.S. and allied military forces should balance offensive and defensive capabilities in service to the damage limitation strategy.
3. **The U.S. and its allies must be prepared to operate in a proliferated setting.** There is no guarantee that arms control will prove successful in stopping—much less reversing—proliferation. As a result, the U.S. and its allies must be prepared to learn how to operate diplomatically and militarily in a proliferated setting. This is a complex undertaking and the lessons of the Cold War provide only limited insights. Learning these lessons should not be seen as accepting as inevitable the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; quite the opposite. Learning these lessons should be seen in the context of signaling would-be aggressors that the U.S. and its allies have options should proliferation take place. The failure to learn these lessons will send the opposite signal, which is that the possession of weapons of mass destruction represents a trump card. If weapons of mass destruction are seen as a trump card, their proliferation *will* become inevitable.

Recommendations for Strengthening the G-8 Nonproliferation Agenda

G-8 leaders can strengthen their nonproliferation agenda by broadening it. What they have done to date is useful, but too narrowly focused on arms control, dismantlement, and security. The G-8 can use the opportunity presented by the Gleneagles Summit to put in place the defensive and military tools necessary to accompany the policies they have already adopted. These recommendations include:

Recommendation #1: Adopt a statement endorsing a damage limitation strategy for addressing the proliferation danger. This overarching strategy should direct how the tools of deterrence, defenses, offensive military capabilities, and arms control should be used in concert with one another to reduce the incentives for others to obtain weapons of mass destruction; reduce the likelihood that such weapons will be used in acts of aggression; limit the scope of any attacks that may occur using such weapon; and limit the damage such attacks may inflict—thus expediting recovery.

Recommendation #2: Amend the G-8 Global Partnership principles to include a principle that explicitly reserves military options for deterring the acquisition, threatened use of, and actual use of weapons of mass destruction by aggressive powers. Specifically, this principle should state that nuclear deterrence remains an essential element of international security. At the same time, it should recognize that the requirements for nuclear deterrence are different from those of the Cold War. Second, the principle should state that G-8 states recognize that all states that are directly threatened by weapons of mass destruction or suffer an attack using such weapons have an inherent right of individual and collective self defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Finally, the principle should state that the G-8 states, as appropriate, will build and maintain the military forces necessary to support this principle. The foundation for this principle may be found in the Bush Administration's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review.

Recommendation #3: Adopt a statement recognizing that a mix of offensive and defensive capabilities is the best military approach for addressing the proliferation danger. This statement would serve to flesh out the amendment to the Global Partnership principles described above. It would make it clear that Cold War military policies are generally not applicable to today's world. This statement should also specifically endorse greater cooperation among G-8 nations in the areas of ballistic missile defense, cruise missile defense, air defense, and the defense of space-based assets.

Recommendation #4: Obtain an agreement among G-8 leaders to conduct simulations that assume a proliferated setting. This agreement would commit G-8 leaders to directing their governments—both individually and, where appropriate, among themselves—to undertake simulations and other exercises that assume a proliferated environment. If G-8 leaders truly want to discourage proliferation, particularly by those bent on aggression, they must demonstrate that they are prepared to address realized proliferation threats. They cannot afford to assume that arms control will succeed, while at the same leaving themselves unschooled in how to respond if arms control fails.

Recommendation #5: Move to adopt standards for measuring the outcomes of the programs under the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and

Materials of Mass Destruction. To date, G-8 leaders have been measuring the success of the Global Partnership on the basis of inputs. They have focused on expanding the number of participating states and realizing the goal of \$20 billion in funding commitments. Now is the time for the G-8 to start focusing more keenly on outcomes. Measuring successful outcomes must include qualitative assessments as well as quantitative ones. Simply measuring the tons of chemical agent destroyed in Russia or the tons of fissile material put into secure locations will be insufficient. Qualitative assessments will serve to measure progress toward meeting the requirements of the damage limitation strategy. Specifically, G-8 leaders need to explain how the Global Partnership programs have reduced the likelihood of future attacks with weapons of mass destruction, have reduced the possible scopes of such attacks, have lessened the damage that might otherwise be inflicted by such attacks, and explain why programs have made a material contribution to these goals. Further, these assessments should apply to the additional principle proposed in Recommendation #2 regarding military and defensive programs.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the G-8 agenda on nonproliferation has made a material contribution toward addressing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction will serve to dismantle many dangerous weapons and secure dangerous materials, starting in Russia and then moving to other states. The Proliferation Security Initiative is serving to interdict ships of dangerous equipment for the production of weapons of mass destruction. The agenda is moving to make the instrument of arms control more relevant to today's environment. The Bush Administration deserves the support of Congress in its efforts to combat the proliferation menace through the G-8 process.

Having said that, however, the G-8 process has been too narrowly focused on arms control and cooperative threat reduction. Relevant military and defenses tools must be brought to the fore in G-8 deliberations on matters related to proliferation. This must start with the adoption by the G-8 of an overarching concept that defines the proper roles of deterrence, defenses, offensive military capabilities, and arms control in addressing the proliferation problem. This must start with the adoption of a damage limitation strategy.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.